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The different gears of EU citizenship  
The cornerstones of EU citizenship are the right of free movement and the right 
not to be discriminated against on grounds of nationality. In this article, I choose 
three categories and test either the overlap between EU citizenship status and 
practice (Eurostars) or the mismatch between the two (‘perceived as Roma EU 
citizens’ and EEA-non-EU citizens - Norwegians in this case). I use a performative 
citizenship approach and, based on 51 interviews with free movers, I analyse how 
their free movement acts extend and challenge EU citizenship. I argue that the 
differentiated practice of free movement creates different gears of EU citizenship 
and, thus, an internally differentiated membership as well as a quasi-EU citizenship 
outside the formal status.  
Keywords: EU citizenship, free movement, equal treatment, acts of citizenship, 
Eurostars, ‘perceived as Roma’, Norwegians 
 
Introduction 
The relationship between free movement and EU citizenship is understudied. Even more 
so is the relationship between free movement and an equal EU citizenship. This article 
sheds light on how the differentiated enactment of free movement gives birth to a 
differentiated EU citizenship. I argue that the mismatch between equal provisions and 
unequal practices can only be studied through the analysis of acts of EU citizenship. 
I choose three categories that test either the overlap between EU citizenship status 
and practice (Eurostars) or the mismatch between the two (‘perceived as Roma EU 
citizens’ who have seen their free movement reversed and EEA-non-EU citizens - 
Norwegians in this case) and show how they are constructing, extending and challenging 
EU citizenship. I base this study on 51 in-depth interviews with free movers and inquire 
about their exercise of free movement rights, claims for non-discrimination, and 
2 
 
understanding of EU citizenship.  
My endeavour is rooted in the assumption that theorizing citizenship should go 
further than merely interrogating status by exploring the more substantive aspects (Isin 
2008). This can be achieved through the study of ‘practices of making citizens – social, 
political, cultural and symbolic’ (Isin, 2008, 17). I argue that in ‘perception and practice, 
if not in law – EU citizenship has evolved into a form of transnational citizenship practice’ 
(Shaw, 2018, 164) through the exercise of its transnational rights: the free movement 
rights. I thus look at the practice of free movement as being constitutive of EU citizenship 
and explore whether practice and status correspond. I aim to capture the paradox of a 
relationship in which ‘citizenship rights can be enjoyed without de jure becoming a 
citizen and becoming a citizen does not per se guarantee the enjoyment of citizenship 
rights’ (Kochenov, 2009, 174).   
Free movement and equal treatment  
Even if, arguably, the most important entitlement, free movement is not the only right 
attached to the EU (Ferreira and Kostakopoulou, 2016). EU citizenship rights cover: free 
movement rights, rights linked to voting and political representation, rights linked to 
diplomatic protection, rights facilitating the communication with EU institutions, and the 
prohibition of discrimination (Articles 18-25 TFEU). Nevertheless, exclusive to EU 
citizens are the political rights: the right to vote for the European Parliament and for the 
local elections in your EU country of residence. But the electoral rights can be deemed 
weak because of their ‘structural neglect of the principle of equality’ (Kochenov 2009, 
205): not all votes weigh the same at the EU level, there are no voting rights at the national 
one, and there is a great variety of ways in which Member States define what their national 
and local elections are.  
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Consequently, free movement and equal treatment are the innovations conferred 
by EU citizenship and the two come together in the TFEU under the title of ‘Non-
discrimination and citizenship of the Union’ (Articles 18-25 TFEU). However, I argue 
that the enactment of the first goes against the arrangement of the second: the 
differentiated practice of free movement leads to the creation of both a differentiated EU 
citizenship and an anomaly, namely a quasi-EU citizenship.   
Not only is free movement the cornerstone of EU citizenship (Recchi 2015, 1), 
but, arguably, EU citizenship only holds value through the exercise of this free movement, 
as ‘the rights which the citizen of the Union has by virtue of that citizenship apply only 
when he or she is outside his or her Member State of underlying citizenship’ (Guild 2004, 
42). The importance of free movement within the EU borders also arises from its 
comparability to the free movement of citizens within their states (Guild 2004, 25), the 
latter being fundamental to full national citizenship (Maas 2013, 14).  
Free movement can be seen as an equalizing tool because it ‘grants every citizen 
of the Union the opportunity to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States’ (Kochenov 2009, 156). Read in conjunction with the principle of non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality, the free movement right means full ‘“home 
treatment” in any of the Member States where a European citizen chooses to reside’ 
(Kochenov 2009, 194). Home treatment seems to hint at an expectation of equality among 
the body of EU citizens. From this perspective, the citizenship of the Union reflects a 
project of equality by giving ‘undifferentiated individual rights for all who have the status 
of citizen’ (Maas 2013, 9).  
However, free movement can also be seen as a differentiating tool when 
considering the economic conditionality included in the Citizens’ Rights Directive 
4 
 
(Directive 2004/38/EC), and the existence of the right to expel. There is room for 
optimism, nevertheless, and Kostakopulou builds on the ECJ jurisprudence to show the 
gradual weakening of the ‘link between the economic status and the right of free 
movement’ (Kostakopulou 2008, 291) and to illustrate the transformative nature and 
potential of EU citizenship. Shaw also notes a tendency of free movement to shade into 
a ‘second tendency where citizenship is endowed with meaning’ (Shaw 1998, 303). 
However, ‘if EU citizens can easily become erased and expelled from the Member State 
of their residence’ then, for the time being, ‘the fundamental status of EU citizenship is 
just an abstraction’ (Kostakopoulou 2014, 462). It is precisely this weakness that the case 
study of ‘perceived as Roma’ helps illustrate.  
 It is the differentiated practice of free movement that creates a differentiated EU 
citizenship. In addition to the traditional settlement migration, studies on the 
differentiation of free movement in the EU have uncovered the emergence of new patterns 
of migration: circular migration (mostly associated to manual work), bi-national 
migration (often referring to students) and footloose migration (mostly associated with 
‘expats’) (Engbersen et al. 2017, 341). They also unveiled a ‘diversification of diversity, 
showing a wide range of types in terms of socioeconomic status and duration of stay’ 
(Scholten and Ostajen 2018, 251).  Although my analysis is not guided by these patterns, 
but, as explained in the introduction, by the overlap and mismatch between arrangement 
and enactment, it does provide insights into these, in particular into the novel pattern of 
back-and-forth or circular migration. 
A performative citizenship approach allows us to capture the ‘key role’ actors 
have ‘in contesting and constructing citizenship and attaching meaning to rights’ (Isin 
2017b, 501). My assumption is that free movement is constitutive of EU citizenship, as 
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people without the formal status not only enjoy de facto the same treatment, but also add 
to the repertoire of EU citizenship.  
 
Methodological reflections 
This article is based on 55 in-depth audio-recorded interviews conducted in 2016-2017 - 
17 with each of the three categories of free movers and four with mediators or members 
of NGOs working on Roma rights. I used purposive sampling followed by a snowballing 
technique. Different genders, ages and professions were included within each of the three 
categories, and the rationale and technique for each type of participant recruitment are 
detailed below.  
 Eurostars are full beneficiaries of free movement and EU citizenship. As defined 
by Favell (2008) and Favell and Recchi (2009), they represent the peak of EU citizenship. 
Like Favell (2008, 237), I utilized a qualitative, investigative approach, and used their 
networks to contact them. As a difference from Favell (2008), my work also included 
Eastern Europeans as my only requirements were that they have lived in at least two EU 
countries other than that of origin and that they have attended higher education. I started 
my snowballing technique in Brussels, where 9 of the Eurostars were based, and from 
there I followed their networks and interviewed other 8 Eurostars living in places ranging 
from Berlin to London. I also sought to interview people with different professions (from 
architects to EU officials) and of different ages. Age is important, as it could be that 
European mobility creates opportunities for the young and unease for the old (Favell 
2008). Under the assumption that this might be the case, I purposefully recruited middle-
aged parents (Eurostar 5, Eurostar 6, Eurostar 15, Eurostar 17) whose children were 
attending school, thus requiring a stable residence. By doing this, I wanted to ensure the 
6 
 
trajectories are as diverse as possible while still revolving around the easy and low-cost 
EU free movement. 
The formal EU citizens who have seen their free movement reversed are the 
expelled or ‘voluntarily returned’ ‘perceived as Roma’ EU citizens. The expulsion of 
‘perceived as Roma’ from France in the summer of 2010 drew broad attention to this 
practice as it exposed the entailed violations of the Citizens’ Rights Directive, which, it 
emerged, was not fully transposed in French law, the Racial Equality Directive (Directive 
2000/43/EC), the Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) and, ultimately, of 
human rights (European Roma Rights Centre, 2010). This is the case especially as it was 
proven that the purposive targeting of ‘Roma’ was stated in an Interior Ministry memo 
which required the eviction of unlawful camps ‘prioritising those of Roma’ (Interior 
Ministry, 2010).  
My snowballing technique for recruiting interviewees who have seen their free 
movement reversed started from NGOs dealing specifically with Roma, most notably 
Romeurope, Asset 93, La Voix des Rroms, and European Roma Rights Centre. I met the 
first three migrants in Paris, and found out that they had received at least one expulsion 
order. I met three voluntarily returned free movers in Petroşani and finally I interviewed 
the other 11 in Calvini. Among them there were two overlapping patterns, as those who 
had received money for the voluntary return were sometimes also the ones engaging in a 
back and forth mobility. Most of them self-identified as Romanians and some associated 
their discrimination with the fact of being Romanians. Hence, there is nothing that allows 
me to categorize these individuals as Roma, especially since I subscribe to a Bourdieusian 
perspective (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991) that expert discourses are powerful tools for 
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the imposition of identities. Consequently, I will use the category of ‘perceived as Roma’ 
(indicated as PR in the interviews transcripts). 
Finally, EEA-non-EU citizens were chosen because their countries adopted the 
so-called ‘Citizens’ Rights Directive’ through its incorporation into the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area (EEA Agreement). De facto, they are non-EU citizens covered 
by the Citizens’ Rights Directive. I follow Garcia Andrade’s argument that freedom of 
movement, perceived as the essential ‘right conferred by this status, has also been granted 
to these third country nationals raises issues’ (Garcia Andrade 2014, 111). I argue that 
this allows them to enact EU citizenship and I propose the term ‘quasi-EU Citizens’ to 
describe them, as they are the closest one can get to EU citizenship without formally 
having the status.  
Norwegians (and not Icelanders or Liechtensteiners) were selected because, as the 
2017 Eurostat (Eurostat 2017) statistics show, they are the most important presence in the 
EU among the three nationalities. As in the case of Eurostars, my snowballing technique 
started in Brussels, where 8 of the Norwegians I interviewed were based and continued 
over Skype in various locations in Europe, ranging from Stockholm to London. 
For all free movers, the interview questions dealt with the reasons for migration, 
expectations, studies and work, integration, participation, discrimination and EU 
citizenship and identity (or lack thereof). However, the interviews with the ‘perceived as 
Roma’ touched on all these but were designed to revolve around the expulsion/return 
experience. Most importantly, I invited all the interviewees to discuss how they enact 
their freedom of movement and EU citizenship or, if this was ever the case, how they 
reacted when they were discriminated against.  
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Isin, who developed the performative citizenship approach explains how ‘‘acts’ 
of citizenship do not exist as such, but it is we who interpret the struggles and actions as 
acts’ (Isin 2013, 22). My research engages with language, with claims and demands of 
citizenship as narrated by the interviewees. Nonetheless, not all interviews refer to 
speech-act informed performances (Aradau and Huysmans 2017, 138), as some deal with 
actions and events, as it will be discussed throughout this article. The interviews were 
transcribed and coded based on the distinction between assertion and extension detailed 
below with the purpose of comparing between the three categories of free movers.  
Acts of EU citizenship 
An act of EU citizenship is understood as an act ‘intended to clarify or modify European 
citizenship status, or which embodies claims to rights or consideration in terms of the 
status or ideals of European citizenship’ (Saward 2013, 52), thus an addition to the 
repertoire of EU citizenship (Isin 2017a, 198). In his 2013 discussion on acts, Isin 
excludes ‘routine social actions that are already instituted’ (Isin 2013, 24) and highlights 
how acts introduce a rupture by being ‘creative, unauthorised and unconventional’ (Isin 
2013, 24). This is in line with the idea of acts as assertions that tend ‘to emphasize the 
constitutive role of rupture, disorder and deviation in the political terrain of European 
citizenship’ (Aradau et al. 2010, 956). Saward’s (2013) contribution throws another 
player in the game, the acts of extension, which he nevertheless describes as institutional 
acts. In what follows, I borrow the acts of citizenship framework and use it in an 
innovative manner. I apply it to new empirical material, showing how acts of extensions 




Extending the acts of extension 
If acts of extension are non-institutional acts, then my conceptualization of them runs the 
risk of exhibiting conceptual vagueness, as any act could potentially be seen as extending 
citizenship. But my focus is narrowed down to the relationship between the EU 
citizenship status and its cornerstone, or core rights: the free movement rights. I 
investigate how the latter extend and challenge the former, and argue that the 
differentiated enjoyment of free movement rights results in a differentiated EU 
citizenship.  
The acts by EEA-non-EU citizens are, I argue, acts on the concept of EU 
citizenship but not by actors having the formal status, which lays in contrast with Saward 
(2013, 54) view that acts under the dynamic of extension ‘tend to be’ – ‘primarily acts 
on, and within formal citizenship status’. Nevertheless, I argue that their enactment of 
free movement is constitutive of EU citizenship. I thus propose the concept of quasi-EU 
citizens to describe them. This concept is an anomaly, as is the fact that formal EU citizens 
have seen their free movement reversed, and both instances are far from Saward’s (2013) 
expectation that acts of extension address anomalies. They can even create them. 
 My approach shifts the focus away from institutional acts of extension to 
individual acts of extension. Saward (2013) expects the actors to be judicial or 
governmental institutions, but this is not the case in my analysis either, as, I argue, free 
movers weave EU citizenship. Their freedom of movement both concerns the current 
understanding of EU citizenship and challenges it. Free movers are both ‘extending 
formal conceptions of community and citizenship’ while, at the same time, producing 
‘new questions, claims, subjectivities and agendas for European citizenship’ (Saward 
2013, 54).  
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Based on this discussion, I propose a minimalist definition in which acts of 
extension add new examples and meaning to the repertoire of EU citizenship without 
involving rupture, while acts of assertion are claims and demands for EU citizenship 
rights and equal treatment. Both types of acts happen through free movement.  
Enactment through extension 
Acts of extension attach new meaning to EU citizenship by the mere use of free movement 
rights. The novelty comes from the fact that both ‘perceived as Roma’ and Norwegians 
exercising their free movement in the EU act with prior authorization but, nevertheless, 
challenge the concept of EU citizenship. Their enactment of the right of free movement 
extends the borders of EU citizenship and, hence, modifies the concept. It is not a 
spontaneous, one-off act, but a constant extension through a well-established right.  
The authorized mobility of the three categories of free movers associates new 
motivations and trajectories to EU citizenship. Every single migrant out of the 51 was 
expecting the host country to be better than the country of origin in some regards. 
However, if the interviewed Norwegians mostly decided to leave their country for the 
experiences of living, studying or working abroad, with some Eurostars doing it for the 
same reasons (even if most of them for better professional opportunities), the ‘perceived 
as Roma’, with one notable exception, left to escape poverty.  
The precarious economic situation in Romania was mentioned by most of my 
‘repatriated’ interviewees in Calvini, Paris and Petroşani. They focused on issues of 
poverty, unemployment, as well as discrimination at employment (Mediator 1, Calvini, 
September 2016). However, reasons for migration can also be linked to the desire for 
discovery, as for instance PR 3 recounts how he did not move because of ‘poor standards 
of living, but, you see, sometimes, [it is] destiny or maybe curiosity to discover other 
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mentalities’ (PR 3, Paris, May 2017). This narrative is close to most stories I heard from 
Eurostars and even more so from Norwegians: people also embark on this adventure out 
of curiosity.  
The differences between the reasons for migration of Eurostars and Norwegians 
were quite striking. First, some Eurostars did voice the reasons laid down by Favell, 
expressing the fact that they moved because they felt the opportunities in their home 
countries were blocked ‘by hierarchical, nepotistic, or arbitrary career paths’ (Favell 
2008, 63). One of them specifically mentioning how ‘older people in key positions make 
it difficult for younger ones to succeed’ (Eurostar 17, July 2017). Another Eurostar even 
said she would prefer to be in her home country if the professional opportunities were not 
blocked (Eurostar 1, February 2017). In addition, a Eurostar, working as an architect, said 
she decided to move because there were not ‘enough perspectives to advance and to 
improve’ (Eurostar 2, February 2017). Finally, Eurostar 7, a German national, told me he 
moved to Brussels because he felt he was ‘kind of stuck in [his] job in Germany’ (Eurostar 
7, August 2017). I asked him whether his study mobilities to the US, The Netherlands 
and The Czech Republic opened his appetite for subsequent mobilities to which he 
replied, ‘I think I would have been mobile anyway’ (Eurostar 7, August 2017). Maybe 
especially because their reasons for migration were often linked to self-fulfilment 
(Santacreu et al. 2009), for Eurostars, more than for Norwegians, benefiting from free 
movement also meant benefiting from social mobility. 
Quite distinctively, Norwegians never mentioned blocked opportunities. Many of 
them first moved for studies, because they found a better, more suited or shorter academic 
programme elsewhere (Norwegian 1, Norwegian 2, Norwegian 5, Norwegian 10, 
Norwegian 11, Norwegian 16, etc). Moreover, an important number of Norwegian 
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interviewees were residing in the EU and working for the Norwegian state (Norwegian 
8, Norwegian 9, Norwegian 14). However, one of the most important findings was that 
most of them were planning to return to Norway, as it will be discussed further down. 
Quite relevant, four out of the 17 interviewees had already returned to Norway. 
Returns 
As far as returning to the country of origin is concerned, the three categories of free 
movers had quite different paths. Among the category of ‘perceived as Roma’ migrants, 
there were the ‘repatriated’, those who stayed in France and those who were engaged in 
a back and forth migration. One ‘voluntarily returned’ family in Petroşani, PR4 and PR 5 
(Petroşani, August 2016) struggled to accept the outcome, especially since their child is 
a French national. Others recalled that at some point they had the option of the ‘voluntary 
return’ but ‘chose not to wait for their money because they were supposed to (…) take 
you for one month, to isolate you somewhere, in a centre or something’ (PR 6, Petroşani, 
August 2016). 
There were families who were happy with their back and forth mobility (PR 7, PR 
8, PR 9 and PR 12, PR 13 PR 14). For example, when PR 13 told me they go back and 
forth between Romania and France, he mentioned that, as ‘we no longer need a visa, we 
stay for a year and we get back during the summer’ (PR 13, Calvini, September 2016). 
These families mentioned that for the past ten years, several of which were under 
transitional free movement restrictions for Romania, they were spending some time in 
France, mostly collecting and selling scrap metal, and then going back to Romania and 
they were very happy with this way of life. Their stories show how easy it sometimes is 
to exercise the right of free movement and, hence, to enact EU citizenship. Consequently, 
in what is maybe not such a different manner from the mobility of Eurostars and 
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Norwegians, this back and forth mobility of some ‘perceived as Roma’ reveals the 
accessibility of EU freedom of movement. These repeated mobilities are a clear form of 
enactment through extension and associate the whole plethora of back and forth mobilities 
to the repertoire of EU citizenship.  
As mentioned before, most Norwegians I interviewed were planning to return to 
Norway. Some explanations for the desire to return were quite unique. For instance, 
Norwegian 4 (Brussels, June 2017) explained she wanted to return because she missed 
the nature and the landscapes. However, most of them gave the same reason: the social 
welfare. The reasons are summarized by Norwegian 2 (Brussels, June 2017): ‘It’s safe to 
work in Norway, it’s more permanent. And then the social rights that you have in Norway, 
safety nets’. The welfare state, the social benefits, the quality of the schooling and the 
high salaries were frequent arguments. Moreover, Norwegian 15 (August 2017) noted 
that she needed to return because the salaries in other countries would not allow her to 
pay back her student loans at the same rate.  
One particularly interesting case of extension concerned the Norwegians who had 
third country national (TCN) spouses (Norwegian 7, Norwegian 9, Norwegian 11). For 
instance, one of my interviewees (Norwegian 11, July 2017), who had lived in Italy 
together with his Australian spouse explained how having previously lived in an EU 
country has helped them. Indeed, the right of residence of TCNs falls outside the scope 
of the EEA Agreement if they are not family members of an EEA national exercising 
their right of free movement. Nevertheless, the right of free movement of EEA citizens 
should not be hindered in any way, hence the TCN family members derive certain rights 
according to the Directive (EEA Joint Committee 2007). Consequently, the fact of having 
resided in an EU country (with a TCN partner) changes the family reunification 
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conditions for a Norwegian citizen returning to their home country. This shows the 
uncharted effects of EU freedom of movement and reinforces the idea that non-EU 
citizens enact EU citizenship and extend its application and boundaries.  
As far as Eurostars are concerned, only two out of the 17 I interviewed expressed 
their desire to return to their home countries. One of the most striking aspects was their 
propensity to move again. For example, Eurostar 12 explained that ‘usually, when I 
moved away it was without kind of saying ‘“oh! I’m gonna settle here!” I am an EU 
citizen, I can travel wherever’ (Eurostar 12, August 2017). Another interviewee, this time 
a settled parent, links her propensity to move to the economic status, arguing that: 
I don’t feel like a migrant. Realistically, I think I don’t because I have money. It’s 
easy and comfortable from my position to live anywhere (…). I feel European, 
sometimes much more than Italian. In that sense, I feel like I can travel or live 
anywhere. I chose Brussels for various reasons, but if tomorrow somebody tells me 
I need to relocate, I would try to make the most of it (Eurostar 6, Brussels, June 
2017). 
Eurostar 16 (August 2017) stressed the fact that her parents’ financial support was crucial 
for the ease of her mobility. Eurostars are nevertheless different from global elites, as they 
tend to be issued from the middle class (Favell 2008) and to emigrate in quest for self-
fulfilment. Their mobility - both spatial and social - is made possible by the low-costs of 
free movement. The idea is reinforced by Eurostar 3:  
‘I see myself as a European citizen, I don’t think I would consider myself an ‘elite’. 
For me, the concept of ‘elite’ brings quite a lot of baggage … I would maybe say 
that yes, I am part of a certain class (upper-middle class), if we want to define it in 
economically terms’ (Eurostar 3, February 2017). 
 The acts described above have a prior authorization and do not involve a rupture, 
but still add meaning to EU citizenship. Back and forth mobility, family reunification of 
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Norwegians with TCN partners, social mobility through spatial mobility are new 
trajectories being attached to EU citizenship. Moreover, easy, low-cost mobility, 
propensity to move again are from now on part of what EU citizenship means.  
Enactment through assertion 
Acts of assertion involve rupture and disorder, standing up for rights and claiming EU 
citizenship. When engaging in them, free movers demand their rights and equal treatment. 
I argue that the mere freedom of movement of ‘perceived as Roma’ is both extension and 
assertion. It is extension not only because the back and forth mobility is added to EU 
citizenship repertoire but also because acts of expulsion and voluntary returns are from 
now on associated with EU citizenship. As Saward observes, these ‘perceived as Roma’ 
are ‘in a sense, daring to act as citizens, and highlighting potential contradictions at the 
heart of the status’ (Saward 2013, 55). 
Hence, their freedom of movement per se is also a form of assertion. The EU 
freedom of movement, as specified by the Citizens’ Rights Directive, is economically 
conditioned. My interviewees were enacting EU citizenship through assertion by 
exercising their freedom of movement without undertaking what could be called ‘formal’ 
economic activities in their host countries. In this way, they are collectively challenging 
the conditionality between freedom of movement and economic activities comprised 
within the Directive. The question that arises then is: are the kind of activities described 
by the interviewees economic activities? For instance, PR 15 and PR 17 gave me details 
about their occupation while in France. PR 15 said they  ‘worked hard, with scrap metal, 
with trash cans this is our profession when we go abroad’ (PR 15, Calvini, September 
2016). Could the collection of scrap metal or old household appliances and their 
commercialization or recycling for money be seen as economic activities? These 
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activities are not accepted as economic activities under EU law, but the migrants 
themselves perceive them as their work when abroad.  
Collective dimension aside, the ‘perceived as Roma’ also assert their rights, 
claiming what is theirs, individually. The examples below range from the mere 
contestation of the treatment or discrimination by authorities, to the enactment of EU 
citizenship by asserting their right of free movement. For instance, PR 14 mentioned the 
discrimination by the French administration when applying for housing. He told the story 
of a civil servant who did not do them justice. He disappointedly underlines: ‘Can you 
imagine what racism is capable of doing; this means racism! If we are in the EU, we 
should be legally equal’ (PR 14, Calvini, September 2016).  PR 3 has a similar story and 
told me how after almost 7 years spent in France, he is filing a discrimination complaint 
concerning access to housing. He went on to say that ‘only if you take them to Court can 
you regulate your situation. Not to be able to access your rights, for the mere fact of 
having a Romanian ID, whether you’re gypsy, or Romanian, it’s the same to them!’ (PR 
3, Paris, May 2017). I pushed this further and asked him whether he believes this 
discrimination is linked to nationality only, prompting him to reply that: 
Whether you are Romanian, or a gypsy, I don’t know because it’s the same ID. So 
when you hand in your ID and you are Romanian, moreover, if you say you live in 
a squat, and don’t have a payslip or a tenancy agreement. If you would have all that, 
then you wouldn’t go asking them for help, you would have everything. If you don’t 
have that and they don’t help, you’re stuck (PR 3, Paris, May 2017).  
It follows that PR 3 links discrimination to being Romanian but also to an 
underprivileged economic status. He says he does not know whether this is linked to being 
Roma, or being Romanian, given that the ID does not make any mention of ethnicity. The 
mediator in Paris (Mediator 2, Paris, May 2017) highlighted the same idea. When I asked 
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two NGO employees what is it that brings discrimination against these individuals: 
nationality, ethnicity or social status, they both answered that all three work together to 
bring on discrimination (Org1, 1 and Org1, 2, Paris, May 2017). It seems that a process 
of ethnicization of a socio-economic status is taking place. This should be contrasted with 
the privileged economic status both Eurostars and Norwegians acquire or maintain 
through their free movement.  
Another form of enactment through assertion is the choice to return to France 
despite having been expelled or told not to return. PR 15 and PR 17 chose the voluntary 
return by plane: ‘they only told us that we will benefit from 300 euros, a kind of expulsion. 
We use 300 euros and we can no longer return’ (PR 15, Calvini, September 2016). I asked 
if they signed anything and he replied: ‘Absolutely, when we took the money we signed 
a kind of agreement’ (PR 15, Calvini, September 2016).  PR 17 confirmed that they have 
been told they ‘cannot return for the next 5 years, but [while at home] (…) we heard that 
others went back to France, so we went back to France’ (PR 17, Calvini, September 
2016). The so-called ‘signed agreement’, prohibiting the return for five years, raises 
question of its compliance with EU law. This aspect aside, their return to France is a form 
of enacting EU citizenship and claiming a right that is theirs. 
PR 2 (Paris, June 2016) received three expulsion orders, and told me about his 
last experience, in 2012, when he realized his translator at the police office was putting 
words in his mouth. He confronted the translator and said he no longer needed his 
services, explaining to his case worker that the translation was full of lies. This story 
serves as an example of rights assertion, when an expelled person demands their rights to 
an impartial translation.  
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In a somehow similar fashion, PR 1 attempted to resist the police officers who 
picked him up on the street, and to explain that he is registered as a job seeker: ‘I even 
have the documents here, I showed them, I am registered with the Job Centre, and I told 
them, (…) they didn’t even discuss. They expelled me’ (PR 1, Paris, June 2016). 
Afterwards, on his return, he met an NGO employee who helped him successfully appeal 
the decision. Not only did he manage to appeal the decision, but he also sued the police 
for forcefully keeping his dog during his expulsion to Romania and even charging him 
for that.  
Most of those who managed to appeal the expulsion orders or to contest the 
treatment by the authorities did so with the help of NGOs. PR 3, for example, told me he 
did not know his rights before meeting one of these organizations, noting that: 
 if it wasn’t for the organizations, to be honest, I don’t know what would happen, 
(…) I don’t know because there are associations and they still behave so badly and 
violently, if there would be nobody to talk, I think they would be capable of killing 
you. They burry you and nobody will ever know, they incinerate you and nobody 
will ever know’ (PR 3, Paris, May 2017). 
In the same line of thought, PR 15 complained that ‘nobody told us about 
anything. When we were on the camp, they were chasing us, they were expelling us’ (PR 
15, Calvini, September 2016). PR 17 added that ‘nobody came to teach us, we are not 
knowledgeable, we don’t know’ (PR 17, Calvini, September 2016). These accounts 
should be contrasted with the ease of free movement generally described by both 
Eurostars and Norwegians. One Norwegian, who moved to Brussels to study, recalled 
that ‘since my boyfriend and several people I know have done this before, I was somewhat 
of the perception that it would be pretty easy. And I knew I could do this. And it’s an EU 
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country’ (Norwegian 1, Brussels, June 2017). Norwegian 13 also recounted that ‘in terms 
of mobility (…) it was easy and straightforward’ (Norwegian 13, July 2017). 
Even if for all Eurostars the move was easy, job seeking was not always a success 
story. Perhaps revealing is the story of Eurostar 10 (July 2017), who moved from Ireland 
because of the economic crisis to look for employment in France and the United 
Kingdom. He did not manage to find long-term employment in France, but he managed 
to find a temporary solution: ‘we ended up volunteering, doing this organic farming, 
WWOOFing is called’ (Eurostar 10, July 2017). His attitude in regard to being unable to 
find something more permanent is quite contrasting to the one of ‘perceived as Roma’, 
as he said that ‘within a few weeks we realized ‘let’s just turn it into a bit of a trip’ 
(Eurostar 10, July 2017). He then temporarily returned to Ireland, then moved to London 
and finally to Brussels to work in public affairs, but at no point during his interrupted 
mobility was he questioned about his status.  
The interviewed Eurostars did not engage in acts of assertion similar to the ones 
described above by the ‘perceived as Roma’. Acts of demanding clarification regarding 
this free movement or bypassing provisions that hinder it could potentially be seen as acts 
of assertion. Eurostar 9 (July 2017) demanded clarifications about her pension 
contributions transfer from Germany to France. Maybe even closer to assertion, some 
Eurostars learnt how to bypass certain provisions; for instance, Eurostar 11 recalled how 
she did not want to unregister as unemployed in Spain and, as such, she could only ‘get 
this European assistance for two weeks’ (Eurostar 11, July 2017). Hence, when she had 
some medical issues while studying in Norway, she ‘just overdid’ her symptoms in order 
to be taken to A&E. Furthermore, there were also some instances of perceived 
discrimination, as Eurostar 11 and Eurostar 12 (August 2017) voiced stories of feeling 
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discriminated during job interviews. They both had the feeling that the potential 
employers were looking to hire a national of the country (in France and the Netherlands 
respectively). However, Eurostar 8 (July 2017), a Bulgarian national residing in the UK, 
made some interesting points on the relationship between discrimination and education 
level. After self-identifying as Roma he went on to say:  
‘I observe this happening to lots of Roma (…). But once I open my mouth, they 
understand that they can’t get far with a bad attitude with me. I think it’s a question 
of education too – I graduated in Public Policy, so I understand what I want from the 
administration’ (Eurostar 8, July 2017). 
Another Eurostar who self-identified as Roma explained that he ‘do[es]n’t feel 
discriminated in Belgium’, but ‘do[es] feel discriminated in Romania because of [his] 
dark skin’ (Eurostar 17, July 2017). As opposed to the ‘perceived as Roma’ who felt 
discriminated in both country of origin and country of residence, Eurostar 17’s experience 
of spatial mobility was also a form of social mobility that helped him overcome 
discrimination. The same story was told by Eurostar 14, who deemed that being a Roma 
ethnic made it very difficult for her to integrate in the labour market back home, but not 
in Belgium (Eurostar 14, July 2017). 
Most Norwegians I interviewed claimed they never felt discriminated against; 
quite the contrary : ‘no, no, maybe rather the opposite. That’s easy, very easy to do stuff.’ 
(Norwegian 1, Brussels, June 2017). A different answer came from a ‘dedicated 
European’ who told me ‘let’s say I feel discriminated inside’ (Norwegian 3, Brussels, 
June 2017). He went on to tell me two stories of enactment of EU citizenship through 
assertion, when he demanded his rights. In the first instance, he flew to Switzerland where 
there were two lines: non-EU and EU and Switzerland and he made a fuss about being 
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discriminated by the sign. Another powerful story concerns his visit to the municipality 
in Brussels:  
The only problem I had it was when I went to the commune and got my carte 
residence, and this is a problem right now, I’ll tell you. Because there were two 
categories, EU citizens and non-EU citizens (…) Now as I look rather Norwegian, I 
took advantage of people’s prejudice about my blue eyes and blond hair and I cut 
into the other line. And when I got to the ghiché, I make my case: listen, I am not an 
EU citizen, but boy, am I close! I am a Norwegian and she said: you are accepted’ 
(Norwegian 3, Brussels, June 2017). 
Overall, these acts of assertion dealt with instances of demanding rights and equal 
treatment and taking up EU citizenship. ‘Perceived as Roma’ and Norwegians described 
more such instances than Eurostars did. From taking legal action against discriminatory 
treatment to the mere gesture of standing in a different line than the one you are assigned 
to, these free movers are claiming EU citizenship rights. By demanding equal treatment 
to EU citizens, Norwegians constitute themselves as quasi-EU citizens.  
Differentiated free movement  
The migrants’ understanding of their free movement varied greatly. PR 15 spontaneously 
said they are refugees. PR 17, contradicted him, signalling that they are part of the EU 
too, so they should have the same rights (PR 15 and PR 17, Calvini, September 2016). 
When asked if they knew for how many months they were allowed to stay in France, they 
replied ‘originally, we were supposed to stay for three months. But during these three 
months, they didn’t give us anything, they didn’t do anything for us. Nobody, absolutely 
nobody came to help us’ (PR 15, Calvini, September 2016). This reveals the false 
expectations some of the migrants had. They went to France hoping that all sorts of aids 
will be provided, or that they will be treated as refugees.  
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For the other two categories, the expectations were of ease. When I asked 
Eurostars and Norwegians whether they felt they were migrants or not, the answers I got 
were highly diverse. For example, Eurostar 13 (September 2017) replied ‘yes’ to both 
questions: are you a migrant and are you an EU citizen. The same answer come from 
Eurostar 4 (Brussels, June 2017): ‘I am a migrant. I come from Italy, I went to the UK, 
and now I’m in Belgium. I think it makes me a migrant, although they don’t call me a 
migrant’ but she goes on to add ‘I am a European citizen. You can be an EU citizen and 
a migrant. I feel that I am both’. Eurostar 16 (August 2017) also explained that migrant 
and EU citizen go together for her and defined herself as an economic migrant. This 
stands in stark contrast with Eurostar 15’s (July 2017) discussion on the difference 
between her free movement and the traditional economic migration and shows the variety 
of interpretations among Eurostars.  
Furthermore, many Norwegians self-identify as Europeans: ‘I am a European 
from Norway, and I’ve always felt that’ (Norwegian 3, Brussels, June 2017) and ‘I 
wouldn’t call myself a migrant, I would call myself European’ (Norwegian 5, Brussels, 
June 2017). However, technically speaking, Norwegians are TCNs. In line with this, some 
self-identified as global citizens: ‘I don’t really feel like a migrant. I’m more of a global 
citizen. I feel more European than I do Norwegian, I feel like I belong here more than I 
do in Norway’ (Norwegian 6, Brussels, June 2017). For some, this idea goes into the 
normative realm, as Norwegian 17 found very unfair the fact that he did not feel like a 
migrant in Berlin (Norwegian 17, July 2017), most probably hinting at the fact that he felt 
rather privileged. 
My invitation to self-identification led to some highly unexpected results. First, 
surprisingly, more Eurostars than Norwegians self-identified as migrants, even if, from a 
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legal point of view, Norwegians are TCNs. This stays in contradiction with the gradual 
elimination of the ‘migrant’ terminology from EU legal acts and programmes when 
referring to EU citizens (Recchi 2015). In addition, Eurostars tended to embrace both 
categories, migrant and EU citizen whereas some of the Norwegians suggested that the 
migrant identity is excluded by the European one. 
Nevertheless, one valuable account came from a very mobile Norwegian who 
claimed to be ‘a proud migrant’, continuing ‘I am good in French and my appearance is 
Western European so every morning I wake up and I can say: who do I want to be today, 
Belgian or do I want to be a Norwegian?’ (Norwegian 3, Brussels, June 2017). The same 
idea of physical appearance was stressed by another Norwegian in Brussels who told me: 
‘Here people see me as a foreigner, but when I go to Germany, they start talking to me in 
German’ (Norwegian 2, Brussels, June 2017).  
All 34 Eurostars and Norwegians said they benefited fully from the EU right of 
free movement and were never hindered while exercising it. From a different perspective, 
PR 3 told me free movement should be reviewed because Member States are blocking it 
(PR 3, Paris, May 2017). Freedom of movement is an expression of ease and enhanced 
mobility for some, including non-EU-citizens, but an expression of reversed mobility for 
others. These findings lead to the conclusion that EU citizenship has different gears, as 
discussed below. 
Differentiated EU citizenship   
This article assumes that free movement is the key that opens up the EU citizenship 
universe, or that EU citizenship is enacted through free movement. The comparison of 
two different experiences, before and after EEA, in the life of Norwegian 3 underlines 
the benefits brought about by the EEA Agreement: ‘and then, and this is in 2001, the EEA 
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had been in vigour for 7 years and it was fantastic, I had the same rights as every Belgian 
citizen to establish a company, to get funding from whatever government’ (Norwegian 3, 
Brussels, June 2017). This example shows how the entry into force of the EEA Agreement 
radically changed the opportunities of EEA-non-EU citizens and how freedom of 
movement, de facto, allowed for an equal treatment not only regarding EU citizens, but 
also regarding the nationals of that country. In this case, equal treatment followed free 
movement.  
However, the lack of political rights matters for some. Norwegian 5 insightfully 
contrasted it with free movement: ‘I’ve noticed that they can vote in European Parliament 
elections, I cannot, even though I can enjoy travelling around and working in other places 
in Europe, I am not taking part in the process of shaping what Europe I am a part of’ 
(Norwegian 5, Brussels, June 2017). Nevertheless, none of the Norwegian interviewees 
associated these elements with having an underprivileged status in the EU. Quite the 
contrary, the general feeling was that there is no difference between them and EU citizens 
when residing in the EU. As far as the 17 Eurostars are concerned, they all said they felt 
European, or EU citizens, and most of them mentioned EU freedom of movement as the 
biggest EU achievement. Some linked free movement to a political project: ‘mobility is 
a big part of it and getting to know more places gives you a sense of European identity’ 
(Eurostar 4, Brussels, June 2017). Among Eurostars and Norwegians, the most common 
idea was the one of ease: they moved because they had a choice and they were expecting 
everything to be smooth. Among most ‘perceived as Roma’, the leitmotivs were 
discrimination and the need for help. The existence of both centripetal and centrifugal 
tendencies (Bigo 2017) shows the limits of an equal EU citizenship and how, this latter 
can make some EU citizens more equal, while at the same time creating inequalities 
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(Neuvonen 2016). These divergences show that the ‘contradictory processes of inclusion 
and greater equalisation coexist with exclusionary processes’ (Kostakopoulou 2014, 448), 
thus creating different gears within EU citizenship. 
Conclusions  
This article illustrated different dynamics, trajectories, and gears within EU citizenship. 
Formal EU citizens have seen their freedom of movement hindered and reversed while 
other categories of migrants - the Eurostars and EEA-non-EU citizens - enjoy full 
freedom of movement within the EU. I argued that Eurostars, ‘perceived as Roma’, and 
EEA-non-EU citizens enact EU citizenship through free movement, extending and 
challenging its scope.  
As far as the logic of extension is concerned, I proposed an alternative approach 
focusing on the individual and argued that the mere enactment of free movement is 
associating new situations to EU citizenship. From the low-cost mobility introduced by 
Eurostars to the back and forth mobility of the six ‘perceived as Roma’, new acts come 
to be associated with EU citizenship. Finally, the enactment of free movement by 
Norwegians sometimes places them in situations de facto identical to those of formal EU 
citizens, with the notable example of family reunification discussed above. I argued that 
‘perceived as Roma’ EU citizens often enacted their free movement through assertion, 
both collectively - by settling down without a formal economic activity or self-sufficient 
means as required by the Citizens’ Rights Directive - and individually - by making 
complaints against discriminatory treatment or by returning in spite the voluntary return 
agreements or expulsion orders. Some Norwegians also enacted EU citizenship through 
assertion, demanding to be treated equally.   
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Not only is EU citizenship being differentiated, but a quasi-EU citizenship is also 
being created. The latter is different from the concept of denizenship as applied at both 
national (Hammar 1990) and EU (Walker 2008) levels because it goes beyond the rights 
and status of TCNs and focuses on their practice. I argued that the unhindered exercise of 
this practice is constitutive of EU citizenship, as Norwegians are non-discriminated free 
movers who often identify as Europeans. Consequently, the concept of quasi-EU 
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